论文摘要
本文应用博弈论的相关方法（一次性博弈时,主要应用以产量为竞争策略的古诺模型和斯塔克伯格模型）,分析内存芯片市场的企业在不同博弈结构中的不同决策,由此引起的不同得益;解释芯片大厂在短期博弈中总是时而合作时而背弃盟约,最终都争先突破限额的真正原因;重复博弈时,企业在什么样的情况下选择合作,什么情况下选择收获眼前利益;最后对企业获得最大得益的决策进行限制博弈,如果在没有反垄断法限制的国家,应用模型分析出在没有外部强制力的情况下,使这些芯片厂商维持合作的方法,从而最终获得最大的垄断利润;而在有垄断法限制的国家,只能进行非合作博弈,在非合作博弈中,涉及进入新产品市场的问题,本文将多寡头古诺模型和斯坦克伯格竞争模型进行对比分析,得出了芯片企业在什么情况下积极开发新产品有利,什么情况下做追随者更有利的重要结论。The most important of this article is to use related technique of Game Theory toanalyze different choice in specific Game structure of each company in memory chipmarket,and different profit;to interpret the reason why chip companies are not beloyal with others;to interpret when companies choose to co-operate and whenprefers short-term profit in repeated Games;and use a limited Game Theory model todraw a conclusion of how to gain the maxim profit in markets where is noanti-monopoly law.On the contrary,if there are clauses of anti-monopoly law,wecompare N-Cournot with N- Stackberg and obtain when chip companies shoulddevelop new products and when to follow to benefit themselves most.
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标签：市场集中度论文; 斯坦克伯格寡头竞争模型论文; 古诺模型论文; 冷酷策略论文; 主观贴现因子论文;